Never been industrialized: a tale of African structural change by Carmignani, Fabrizio & Mandeville, Thomas
Accepted Manuscript
Title: Never been industrialized: a tale of African structural
change
Author: Fabrizio Carmignani Thomas Mandeville
PII: S0954-349X(14)00051-4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.strueco.2014.09.002
Reference: STRECO 586
To appear in: Structural Change and Economic Dynamics
Please cite this article as: Carmignani, F., Mandeville, T.,Never been industrialized: a
tale of African structural change, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics (2014),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2014.09.002
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication.
As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript.
The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof
before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that
apply to the journal pertain.
Page 1 of 47
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
1 
 
Research highlights 
x Structural change in Africa has taken place without industrialization 
x The average African countries specializes over almost its entire development path 
x The value added from declining agriculture feeds primarily into services 
x Leapfrogging industrialization is not necessarily what causes slow growth 
x Shift from agriculture to non-manufacturing industry is negative for growth 
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Abstract. Africa is a case of structural change without industrialization and without 
diversification. Agriculture’s decline was matched by an increase in services and non-
manufacturing industry, with manufacturing remaining low and stagnant throughout the post-
colonial period. To what extent do these patterns of structural change account for the weak 
growth dynamics observed in the continent? We provide evidence that what is damaging for 
growth in Africa is not the expansion in services, but rather the reallocation of economic 
activity from agriculture to non-manufacturing industry. Because non-manufacturing industry 
is mainly mining, our results point to a form of resource curse.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Africa has never been industrialized, at least not in the conventional sense. Certainly, the 
share of agriculture in total GDP has significantly declined since independence. But this 
decline has been associated with an increase in services (the dominant sector) and non-
manufacturing industry (mostly mining). Manufacturing, instead, has always been marginal, 
with a GDP share stagnating around 10%. At the same time, productive structures in the 
continent have shown a tendency to become more specialized at higher income levels. All 
this is in sharp contrast with the experience of many other developing countries. The obvious 
question is then: to what extent are these peculiar patterns of structural change responsible for 
the weak growth performance of the continent? Or more generally, what is the impact of 
structural change on the macroeconomic dynamics of Africa? The purpose of our paper is to 
provide some empirical evidence to answer these and other related questions.  
There is quite a large body of academic literature that looks at the relationship between 
structural change and macroeconomic dynamics.1 Industrialization, broadly defined as the 
reallocation of resources away from agriculture and toward manufacturing, has been often 
portrayed as the key to making the transition from stagnation to growth (see for instance 
Hansen and Prescott, 2002). Hausmann et al. (2005), Johnson et al. (2006), and Jones and 
Olken (2005) analyse growth episodes in large samples of countries and find that growth 
accelerations often take place in the midst a rapid expansion of manufacturing. This positive 
effect of manufacturing on growth can be explained in two, not mutually exclusive, ways. 
                                                     
1 It is however beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed survey of the literature on growth, structural 
change, and African economic development. In what follows, we provide an overview of some specific strands 
of research that are more directly relevant to our paper. For a recent comprehensive reading on industrialization 
see Szirmai et al. (2012)
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First, a country with a broader-based manufacturing sector is more likely to take advantage of 
technological progress than one which specializes in primary-based products. Second, the 
expansion of manufacturing helps create a middle class that favours the strengthening of 
institutions. Rodrik (2007) formalizes some of these mechanisms in a model where “non-
traditional” manufacturing activities are the source of productive externalities that promote 
growth. Other theoretical models dealing with the macroeconomic effects of the shift from 
the traditional sector to the modern sector include Matsuyama (1992), Echevarria (1997), 
Fagerberg (2000), Kongsamut et al. (2001), and Wang and Xie (2004). In a recent 
contribution, Yaki (2008) presents an OLG model where a sectoral shift from traditional 
agriculture to modern manufacturing interacts with the degree of wealth inequality (which in 
turn determines the size of the middle class) to explain why some countries have successfully 
taken-off while some others have not.2 Szirmai (2012) reviews the theoretical literature and 
empirical evidence for the proposition that industrialisation acts as an engine of growth in 
developing countries. He concludes that while manufacturing has been important for growth 
in developing countries, the evidence is not entirely straightforward and not all the theoretical 
expectations associated with the proposition are supported by the data. 
The process of de-industrialization, or tertiarisation, which is taking place in several 
industrial economies, has also attracted considerable academic interest. Earlier contributions 
by Baumol et al. 1985, Wolff, 1985, and Borjk, 1999 maintain the argument that the rise of 
services and the corresponding decline in manufacturing worsens future growth prospects. 
This would follow from the fact that services are typically characterized by lower 
productivity than manufacturing. Sasaki (2007) provides a formalization of this view within a 
model of unbalanced growth that includes Baumol’s traditional model (Baumol, 1967) as a 
                                                     
2 Yaki’s paper is also related to the vast literature on the interaction between inequality, human capital, and 
growth, see for instance the seminal contributions of Galor and Zeira (1993), Galor and Weil (2000), and Galor 
and Moav(2004). 

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special case. However, recent findings reported by Castaldi (2009) and Maroto-Sanchez and 
Cuadrado-Roura (2009) suggest that several tertiary activities show dynamic productivity 
growth rates and that growth does not necessarily have to decline because of the rise in 
services (see Oulton, 2001 for a theoretical formalization). A closely related debate concerns 
the contribution of IT to productivity and growth revival in the late ‘90s in the US and other 
advanced economies, as for instance discussed by Jorgensen and Stiroh (1999), Jorgensen 
(2001), and Oliner and Sichel (2000).3  
Another relevant strand of research relates structural changes to stages of diversification. The 
standard argument in this case is that economies at early stages of development specialize 
according to their comparative advantage, which most often lies in the agricultural sector. 
Opening new sectors becomes affordable only when factors accumulate; that is, when income 
levels increase. Therefore the prediction is that there is a negative relationship between 
sectoral concentration and per-capita income. In a seminal paper, Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) 
empirically show that this relationship is effectively negative, but only up to a point. Past a 
threshold level of per-capita income around US$ 8800, the relationship turns positive. In 
other words, countries seem to diversify over most of their development path, but once they 
achieve a rather advanced development stage they start specializing again. Arguably, 
specialization in high-income economies could reflect demand linkages that make it optimal 
for firms to cluster geographically4 and/or a progressive decline in trading costs.  
The paradigm of structural change that emerges from all this literature is one where countries 
sequentially shift from agriculture to manufacturing and then to services while progressively 
diversifying their productive base as income levels increase. Two simple stylised facts (which 
we document in Section 2) indicate that Africa does not fit this paradigm. First, declining 
                                                     
3 While earlier contributions tend to focus on the US, some recent papers try and estimate the effect of IT on 
growth and productivity in advanced European economies. See, inter alia, Salvatore (2003), Jalava and Pohjola 
(2007), Martinez et al. (2008), Antonopoulos and Sakellaris (2009), Dimelis and Papaioannou (2010)
4 This explanation draws on arguments pioneered by Krugman (1991).
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agriculture since the early 1960s fed into services and non-manufacturing industries, with 
manufacturing shares remaining stagnant throughout the post-independence era. Second, with 
the exception of a mild tendency to decline at extremely low levels of per-capita income, 
sectoral concentration in African countries increases over almost the entire development path. 
This means that higher income African economies tend to be less (and not more) diversified 
than lower income economies. Therefore Africa is a tale of structural change without 
industrialization and without diversification. We believe that this makes it an extremely 
interesting case study. 
Our analysis will focus on the impact of structural change on the growth performance of 
Africa. More specifically, we want to see whether structural change affects growth after 
controlling for other fundamental determinants of long-term development. Therefore, we will 
not employ shift-share analysis, which would be useful for an accounting exercise whose 
objective is to break down overall growth in contribution from the reallocation of resources 
between sectors and contribution from the increase in productivity within sectors. Instead, we 
will estimate a regression model where growth in African countries is regressed on a vector 
of control and variables that measure the strength of sectoral reallocations. In this respect, our 
work is also related to the empirical literature on the causes of the African “growth tragedy” 
(see Easterly and Levine, 1997; Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Collier and Gunning, 1999; Nunn 
2007 and 2008; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Artadi and Sala-i-Martin, 2003; and Bhattacharyya, 
2009). Berthelemy and Soderling (2001), Poirson (2001), Rodrik (2006), Breisinger et al. 
(2009), Diao et al. (2010), McMillan and Rodrik (2011), and Page (2012) discuss the role of 
structural change in explaining Africa’s weak macroeconomic performance, particularly in 
terms of stagnating factors productivity.  
The paper that is most closely related to ours is probably the one by Wells and Thirlwall 
(2003). They provide a test of Kaldor’s growth laws across African countries. In so doing, 
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they estimate a regression of growth on the share of manufacturing. Yet, our methodological 
approach sharply differs from theirs in several respects. First of all, we do not simply use 
sectoral shares as regressors, but construct a more sophisticated measure of sectoral shift. 
Second, we account for the potential endogeneity of sectoral shifts through instrumental 
variables. Third, we specify our model to include various possible determinants of growth in 
addition to the measure of sectoral shift. Fourth, we explore different estimators, including a 
three-stage system estimator, in order to check the sensitivity of our results. With these 
methdological innovations, we generate a number of results that extend those already 
available from the literature. In particular, we find that tertiarisation is not bad for African 
growth. In fact, what seems to be more damaging for African development is the reallocation 
of economic activity from agriculture to non-manufacturing industry.  
Focusing on Africa is certainly interesting and relevant, but it also involves some data issues 
that ought to be acknowledged upfront. Sectoral employment data at the 1 or 2 digit level of 
disaggregation are not available for many African countries on a panel basis.5 Therefore, we 
have to make two pragmatic choices. First of all, we use value added shares, and not 
employment shares, to measure the size of each sector. Second, we conduct our investigation 
at a rather aggregate level and look at three macro-sectors: agriculture, industry, and services; 
industry is further disaggregated into manufacturing and non-manufacturing (which includes 
mining, construction, and public utilities). The first choice is probably quite acceptable. 
While several of the theories of structural change explicitly refer to sectoral shift in 
employment, value added is rather commonly used as an alternative measure of sector size. 
The second choice is admittedly more drastic. In fact, it is well known that shifts might take 
                                                     
5 Previous literature has often made use of ILO and UNIDO databases. Unfortunately, these databases cover 
only a limited number of African countries. For instance, in the ILO database, there are only 17 African 
countries (plus St. Helena) and for only five of them annual observations are available over a sufficiently long 
period of time. In order to grasp the extent of data limitations for Africa, consider that in their analysis of stages 
of diversification, Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) use the ILO and UNIDO data and have a sample size of 99 
countries, but only 20 of them are African.  
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place within macro sectors (i.e. from traditional to modern agriculture or from labour-
intensive to capital-intensive manufactures) rather than between macro sectors. Still, the 
disaggregation we employ has the merit to match the simplified representation of an economy 
with three types of goods (agriculture, manufacturing, and services) that is often used in the 
theoretical analysis. Clearly, we are aware of the limitations that our two pragmatic choices 
imply. In particular, we will have to rely on reduced form representations of sectoral 
dynamics, thereby missing the finer mechanisms of intra- and inter-sectoral misallocations of 
production factors. Yet, we should be able to identify general equilibrium effects that more 
highly disaggregate micro-data would not fully capture. Moreover, by focusing on value 
added and three macro-sectors, we can extend our coverage to almost the entire Africa (up to 
51 out of 53 countries) rather than having to focus on a narrower sub-set of countries.6  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we present the key stylised facts 
concerning structural change in Africa. Section 3 introduces the model for the econometric 
analysis. Section 4 presents the baseline results, extensions, and sensitivity checks. In section 
5 we engage in further discussion and interpretation of the results and we try to set the 
African experience within a broader development context as well as suggest some 
implications for the role of services in development. Section 6 concludes. Variables definition 
and data sources are provided in the Appendix 1. Appendix 2 contains some evidence to 
support the estimation strategy used in Sections 3 and 4. 
                                                     
6Two further concerns might arise. First, given that Africa consists of a set of heterogeneous countries, 
aggregation into cross-country analysis might imply some loss of individual specificities. However, we must 
stress that (i) the use of control variables in the regression model will capture at least some of these differences, 
thus allowing us to focus on the identification of the common features shared by African countries, and (ii) in 
spite of cross-national differences, Africa is more than just a mere geographical construct: African countries 
participate in several joint economic and political initiatives, they have lived through similar historical 
experiences, and they are often targeted as a bloc by international development initiatives. Therefore, there is 
some merit in a cross-sectional analysis. The second concern relates to the quality of national account data for 
African countries. In our paper we use data from highly reputable sources (like World Bank, 2009), which 
should ensure some quality control, and we apply suitable statistical methodologies that fit the type of data we 
have. While we are aware of possible measurement errors, we think that this is still a better option than not 
doing any quantitative analysis on Africa at all. 

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2. Structural change in Africa: stylised facts 
 
This section documents a few basic stylized facts by looking at the co-movements between 
pairs of relevant variables in the panel of African countries. Because we do not want to 
impose stringent parametric assumptions on the form of the relationships, we follow 
Cleveland (1993 and 1994) and fit locally weighted polynomial regressions for the variables 
of interest.7 See Appendix 1 for variables description and data sources. 
Figure 1 shows fitted lines from local polynomial regressions of sectoral value added shares 
on real per-capita GDP.  It appears that the sectoral composition of GDP undergoes some 
significant changes as per-capita GDP increases. The share of agriculture sharply declines 
while the share of industry increases. However, much of this rise in industry seems to occur 
outside the manufacturing sector. In fact, the share of manufacturing remains generally very 
low at all levels of per-capita GDP. Services instead are the dominant sector over almost the 
entire range of per-capita GDP. Note however that much of the increase in services occurs at 
the very early stages of development. 
The time profile of the structural change is presented in Figure 2, where fitted lines are drawn 
from local polynomial regressions of sectoral shares on the time trend. The decline in 
agriculture has occurred progressively since independence and it has been matched by a 
corresponding increase in industry and services. However, within industry, manufacturing 
                                                     
7 More specifically, consider two variables y and x, i.e. the value added share of manufacturing (y) and per-
capita GDP (x). Data are structured as a panel of m cross sections and t years. We stack cross-section so to 
obtain for each variable a string of N = m u t datapoints.  For each data point xn, with n = 1, 2....N, we fit a 
regression  using only a subset of observations (yi, xi) that lie 
around xn and giving smaller weights to observations that are more distant from xn. A smoothed curve 
representing the relationship between y and x is then traced out from the fitted values of the N local regressions 
evaluated at xn. A relevant property of the smoothed curve is that its shape at high values of x is not affected by 
data points corresponding to low values of x. In implementing the procedure, we use a bandwidth span of 50%; 
that is, each local regression includes only 50% of all sample observations. We also set the degree of polynomial 
of the local regression equal to one. The weighting system is such that observations that are relatively far from 
the point being evaluated get small weights in the sum of squared residuals of the regression
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has remained rather stagnant and on average just around 10% of aggregate GDP throughout 
the five decades of independence.  
Taken together, Figure 1 and 2 provide a first stylised fact: structural change in Africa occurs 
without industrialization, whereby industrialization we mean a significant rise in the share of 
manufacturing. The expansion in the industry sector that we observe is mainly the 
consequence of the rise in mining.    
 
INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 3 displays the relationship between the degree of sectoral concentration of the 
economic structure and the level of per-capita GDP. Concentration is measured by the 
Herfindhal index , where s is the value added share of sector q and q = 
agriculture, industry, services.8 As mentioned in the previous section, using more 
disaggregated data and a larger sample of countries, Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) find a U-
shaped relationship, with a turning point at approximately US$ 8800. Instead, we obtain an 
almost linearly upward sloping fitted line. There is indeed a very small decrease in 
concentration at very low levels of per-capita GDP, but this is rapidly reversed and the 
turning point occurs at around US$ 150. The figure is therefore indicative of a second stylised 
fact: the average African country specializes (rather than diversifies) over almost its entire 
development path. We should also add that in the course of specialization, agriculture is the 
sector that progressively disappears. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
                                                     
8For a review of alternative metrics of structural change see Nyarko (2013).
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The first two stylised facts suggest that in Africa agriculture has fed into services and non-
manufacturing industry. Figure 4 provides some additional evidence on the strength of this 
“feeding-effect”. The fitted lines are obtained from the regression of the change in the 
sectoral share of sector j (with j = manufacturing, services, industry) on the change in the 
sectoral share of agriculture. As expected, the fitted lines for services and industry are 
significantly downward sloping, meaning that an increase in the shares of these two sectors 
corresponds to a decline in the share of agriculture. Moreover, the fitted line for the service 
sector is steeper, thus suggesting that a decline in agriculture is more closely associated with 
an increase in services than in industry. The line for manufacturing is instead flat around 0. 
This confirms that there is little reallocation of value added from agriculture to 
manufacturing. The inverse correlation between changes in agriculture and changes in 
industry must occur because of the reallocation of value added from agriculture to mining and 
other non-manufacturing industry. Therefore, out third stylised fact is that the value added 
from declining agriculture feeds primarily into services, to some smaller extent into non-
manufacturing industry, and to an almost negligible extent into manufacturing. An important 
corollary observation to be drawn from Figure 4 is that there is no evidence of significant 
non-linearities in the correlations between changes in sectoral shares.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Taken together, our stylised facts indicate that structural change in Africa does not fit the 
paradigms portrayed by the literature. In Africa, structural change involves no significant 
industrialization, increasing specialization at higher income levels, and the reallocation of 
value added from agriculture to services and non-manufacturing industry. What does all this 
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imply for economic growth? Before we undertake some more formal econometric analysis to 
answer this question, let us consider the simple summary statistics in Table 1. These are 
average growth rates for different subset of African countries over the period 1960-2008. 
Each subset is defined by the intersection of two groups: (i) countries with increasing (or 
decreasing) share of agriculture and (ii) countries with increasing (or decreasing) share of any 
of the other sectors. The number of countries in each subset is reported next to the average 
growth rate. Thus for example, there are eight countries that over the period 1960-2008 have 
experienced an increase in the share of agriculture and an increase in the share of 
manufacturing. The average annual growth rate in this subset of eight countries is -0.65%. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The data in the table provide some interesting insights. First of all, positive growth is 
generally observed in association with declining agricultural shares. This suggests that in the 
13 countries where agriculture has increased, transformation from traditional to modern 
farming has not occurred. Second, given a decline in agriculture, countries with increasing 
services have achieved the highest average growth rate. The growth rate of countries with 
increasing manufacturing is the second highest and about one percentage point lower than the 
growth rate of countries with growing services. Therefore, sectoral reallocation from 
agriculture directly to services, without passing through manufacturing, does not necessarily 
hurt growth relative to a more conventional process where agriculture feeds into 
manufacturing. Finally, the growth rates associated with increasing industry are quite low in 
general (in fact, they are the lowest in each column) and lower than the growth rates 
associated with increasing manufacturing. Given that in Africa the expansion of non-
manufacturing industry mostly takes the form of rising mining (oil and other natural 
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resources), this might be indicative of some form of resource curse. One might also be more 
specific and note that the most negative growth rate occurs when increasing industry is 
associated with increasing agriculture. As already noted, the expansion in agriculture does not 
seem to be accompanied by a transformation from traditional to modern farming and 
generally determines negative growth. This means that increasing agriculture implies lower 
levels of development and hence that the resource curse is probably more pronounced at the 
early stages of development.  
 
3. Econometric model 
 
In this section, we present a formal econometric analysis of the effect of structural change on 
growth.  
 
3.1. Model specification 
 
Our econometric framework is nested within a standard growth regression model: 
 
 
 
where c denotes a generic country in Africa, g is the annual rate of per-capita GDP growth 
averaged over the period 1960-2008, z is a measure of structural change (see below), W is a 
vector of other potential determinants of long-term growth,   is a stochastic term, and D0, 
D1, and the vector A are all parameters to be estimated.9 
                                                     
9 Eberhardt and Teal (2013) criticize the existing growth empirics literature for focusing on the estimation of an 
aggregate homogenous production function or convergence regression model. They argue that in the presence of 
structural change, aggregate specifications yield unreliable estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) and 
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In our basic specification, the set of controls W includes: ethnic fragmentation, distance from 
equator, a dummy variable for UK legal origin, and the log-level of per-capita income at the 
beginning of the sample period. We acknowledge two possible limitations of this 
specification. One is that it does not include any direct measure of institutional quality and 
good governance (such as indicators of protection of property rights or control of corruption). 
The other is that it may appear too parsimonious, especially if compared to earlier examples 
of Barro’s growth regressions (see, inter alia, Barro, 1991 and 1997; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995). There are however some arguments in defence of our choice. First, each of the four 
controls we have selected has been considered as a potential fundamental cause of growth 
and development in several previous studies (see, for instance, Easterly and Levine, 1997; 
Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Alexeev and Conrad, 2009; Bhattacharyya, 
2009). Second, the four controls seem to explain much of the cross country variation in the 
quality of institutions and governance (see La Porta et al. 1999). In this sense, even if they do 
not directly measure governance and institutional quality, they are still likely to proxy for 
institutional effects. Moreover, our four controls are clearly exogenous and hence do not pose 
problems of instrumentation (as instead other direct measures of institutional quality would). 
Finally, a parsimonious specification is necessary in our case. The model is going to be 
estimated as a cross-section and hence a total of at most 51 observations will be available. 
This means that the specification of W must be sufficiently parsimonious to ensure that there 
are enough degrees of freedom left for reliable statistical inference.  
 
3.2. Empirical definition of structural change  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
hence that researchers should estimate disaggregate production functions for individual sectors. However, the 
purpose of our econometric model is not to produce inference on TFP. In fact, our econometric model takes 
structural change explicitly into account and its objective is to estimate how the shift of economic activity from 
one sector to another affects total growth. Therefore, their critique does not apply to our paper. 

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We empirically measure structural change by the estimated correlation between change in the 
share of agriculture and change in the shares of the other sectors in each country. 
Accordingly, we have three different definitions of z in equation (1): service correlation 
(ser_correl) is the estimated correlation between change in service share and change in 
agriculture share, industry correlation (ind_correl) is the estimated correlation between 
change in industry share and change in agriculture share, and manufacturing correlation 
(manu_correl) is the estimated correlation between change in manufacturing share and 
change in agriculture share.10  
The obvious alternative would be to simply use shares of sectors as regressors. However, 
because we are interested in understanding how different patterns of sectoral reallocation 
affect African growth performance, estimated correlations between changes in sector shares 
seem to be a more appropriate explanatory variable. A limitation of this approach is that 
identical percentage changes in sectors can be associated with different evolution paths in the 
output composition of different countries. Moreover, correlations estimated over a long 
period of time might fail to pick up the specificities of the different phases through which 
African countries have gone since independence (from import-substitution policies to the 
Washington consensus to the more recent approaches to industrialization). Yet, the prevailing 
approach in the development literature is to represent and discuss structural change as the 
process of relocation of value added and/or employment from the traditional sector to the 
modern sectors. Our empirical measures of structural change are consistent with this 
prevailing approach. Furthermore, the correlations seem to summarize quite well the actual 
pattern of structural change observed in some reference African countries. We provide some 
examples here below. 
                                                     
10 Note that because the shares of agriculture, industry, and service add up to one (manufacturing being a 
subsector of industry) and structural change involves some shift in value added from agriculture to industry 
and/or services, ind_correl and ser_correl add up to -1.
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Consider Ethiopia first. In recent years, Ethiopia has gone through a period of significant 
economic growth. Soderbom (2012) dates the beginning of growth acceleration back to the 
second half of the ‘90s, following the economic and political reforms of the post-Menghitsu 
era. Interestingly, this acceleration was associated with some sign of structural 
transformation, after that for decades (but perhaps one should say centuries) Ethiopia’s 
economic structure had remained unchanged and dominated by rain-fed agriculture. Three 
main features characterize the pattern of Ethiopian structural change. First, while remaining 
dominant in terms of employment share, agriculture has seen its importance relatively 
reduced and its share in GDP has declined by more than ten percentage points in fifteen 
years. Second, the relative decline in agriculture has been matched by the raise of services, 
which are now the main engine of economic growth. Third, more moderately, non-
manufacturing industries have also increased in relative importance with respect to both 
employment and value added shares. However, there is no evidence of any significant take-
off in manufacturing. The estimated correlations that we use to measure structural change are 
in line with this pattern. The correlation between agriculture and service (service correlation) 
is large and negative (-0.794), reflecting the first two features described above. The 
correlation between agriculture and industry is also negative and significant, albeit much less 
large in absolute value (-0.205), while the correlation between agriculture and manufacturing 
is negligible (-0.081), consistently with the third feature. 
South Africa is a second interesting example. Rodrik (2006) and Dube et al. (2007) report 
two key stylized facts concerning structural transformation in South Africa. One is that, 
differently from many other African countries, there was an early pick-up in manufacturing. 
In fact, as of the mid-80s, South African manufacturing still accounted for 12% of total 
employment, more than what observed in other countries with comparable output per head 
and total factor productivity (e.g. in Malaysia, the manufacturing share of employment was 
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only 8%). The second stylized fact is the dramatic decline in the employment share of 
tradable sectors (agriculture and mining in particular) and the contemporaneous increase in 
the employment share of private non-tradables (financial intermediation, insurance, real 
estate, and business services) since the 1970s. What this reflects is a decline in agriculture 
and mining which has not been matched by an increase in manufacturing employment. In 
fact, it appears that this premature de-industrialization is at the root of South Africa’s weak 
growth performance over the past two decades. Because of the raise in services at the expense 
of tradables, one would expect a strong negative correlation between agriculture and services. 
The initial pick–up in manufacturing also implies a negative correlation between agriculture 
and manufacturing. However, the intensity of this correlation should be somewhat diminished 
by the subsequent de-industralization phase, during which agriculture and manufacturing did 
not move in opposite direction. Our measures match this pattern: serv_correl is -.642, 
manu_correl is -310 and ind_correl is -.357. 
The third example comes from a group of countries whose pattern of structural 
transformation has been stirred by the discovery and exploitation of natural resources. This 
group includes Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, and Nigeria. Starting from an initial 
situation where agriculture was dominant, the resource boom in these countries led to a fast 
and massive reallocation of value added (more than labour) towards mining. The inflow of 
revenues from natural resources could have provided governments with an opportunity to 
promote diversification, thus leading to a more balanced pattern of structural change where 
manufacturing and other non-mining industries could also expand. However, this did not 
happen, or it has not yet happened, leaving the shift from agriculture to mining as the only 
significant change. Accordingly, all these countries present very large and negative 
correlations between agriculture and industry, and very low, statistically negligible (and 
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sometimes even positive) correlations between agriculture and services and agriculture and 
manufacturing.  
All in all, while we are aware of the potential limitations implicit in our measurement of 
structural change, we believe that estimated correlations (i) are in line with a representation 
of structural change based on reallocation of activity between sectors, (ii) allow us to focus 
on the impact of reallocation on growth, which is the purpose of our econometric exercise, 
and (iii) provide a synthetic picture that is consistent with the actual patterns of structural 
change observed in African countries.  
  
3.3. Endogeneity issues 
 
The process of structural change is endogenous to economic dynamics, meaning that 
correlations between changes in sectoral shares are endogenous to growth. To deal with this 
issue, we estimate equation (1) by a two-step efficient GMM estimator. The traditional 
IV/2SLS estimator is in fact a special case of this GMM estimator and the two coincide for an 
exactly identified model under the assumption of conditional homoscedasticity and 
independence (see Hayashi, 2000).  
The key issue in the implementation of the GMM estimator is to identify valid instruments; 
that is instruments which are (i) strongly correlated with structural change and (ii) 
uncorrelated with the error term in equation (1). The two variables that we identify to such 
purpose are population density and oil reserves. In the rest of this section we present some 
theoretical arguments and preliminary empirical evidence that these two variables are indeed 
relevant and orthogonal to the error process. We also introduce a battery of tests and statistics 
which are commonly used in the literature as diagnostics of the validity of instruments. These 
tests and statistics are then reported together with the estimation results in the next section. 
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3.3.1 Relevance 
 
To be valid, instruments need to be strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor 
(structural change, in this case) even after controlling for the other exogenous controls W in 
equation (1). The first step is therefore to identify variables that are theoretically linked to 
structural change. We consider three. One is population density. The rise of a modern service 
sector is likely to be facilitated by the existence of demand externalities that can arise from 
the geographical clustering of population. In this respect, population density should make the 
negative correlation between share of agriculture and share of services stronger in absolute 
values. Conversely, higher density should make the correlation between services and industry 
(including manufacturing) less negative or even positive. The second determinant we look at 
is resource abundance, as measured by the value of oil reserves in a country. Greater resource 
abundance would lead a country to specialize in mining at the expense of manufacturing and 
services. The expectation is therefore that higher values of the oil reserves variable make the 
correlation between agriculture and industry more negative and the correlations between 
agriculture and services/manufacturing less negative (or even positive). Finally, a third 
important factor affecting the pattern of sectoral reallocation relates to the physical 
configuration of the territory. A higher quality soil would probably favour the transformation 
of agriculture from traditional to modern and reduce the extent of reallocation away from 
agriculture and towards manufacturing. While the argument is intuitively appealing, the 
empirical measurement of soil quality can be quite difficult. However, we rely on a set of 
dummy variables reported by Acemoglu et al. (2001) for deserts, steppes, desert dry winter, 
and dry steppe wasteland. 
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In order to make a preliminary selection of potentially relevant instruments, we run a set of 
OLS regressions of the measures of structural change on the three candidate instruments 
identified above. Results are reported in Table 2. For each structural change variable (service 
correlation, industry correlation, and manufacturing correlation) we report two sets of 
estimates. The first (columns I, II, and III) only includes population density and oil reserves 
as potential determinants of structural change. The second (column IV, V, and VI) also 
includes the soil dummies. In order to assess the goodness of fit of the regression, we also 
provide the F-statistic of joint significance of the regressors and the standard R2.   
As can be seen from the table, population density and oil reserves have the expected sign and 
are generally statistically significant. The soil dummies instead do not seem to add much in 
terms of ability of the regression to explain cross-country variance in structural change 
patterns.11  Based on these regressions, we choose population density and oil reserves as the 
two excluded instruments for structural change.to instrument structural change by population 
density and oil reserves. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Even if the OLS regressions show that population density and oil reserves are significantly 
correlated with structural change, this is not enough to conclude that the instruments satisfy 
the relevance requirement. In the next section, we provide more evidence on relevance by 
reporting the full set of first stage estimates from the two-step GMM procedure plus the 
following statistics: Anderson LR test-statistic, Cragg-Donald Ȥ2 and F statistics, and partial 
R2 of the first stage regression and corresponding F-test of the excluded instruments. Both 
                                                     
11 The estimated coefficients of the regression of service correlation are almost exactly the opposite of the 
estimated coefficients of the regression of industry correlation. This is because, as already noted, the shares of 
agriculture, industry, and services add up to one and hence in aggregate changes between shares must cancel 
out.
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the Anderson LR test-statistic and the Cragg-Donald Ȥ2 statistcs are test of the null hypothesis 
that the estimating equation is underidentified. Rejection of the null therefore indicates that 
the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressor. The Cragg-Donald F-
test is instead a test of weak identification. Low values of the statistic indicate that the 
excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressor, but only weakly. The 
relevant critical values are computed by Stock and Yogo (2005) and reported together with 
the F statistics. The partial R2 of the first stage regression is the squared partial correlation 
between the two instruments and the endogenous regressor. Because there is only one 
endogenous regressor in the estimating equation, the partial R2 corresponds to the Shea’s R2. 
Higher values indicate greater relevance of the instruments. The associated F-statistic is the 
F-test of the excluded instruments. Rejection of the null indicates again indicates that the 
excluded instruments are significantly correlated with structural change. As discussed in 
Section 4, all of these diagnostics do confirm that the two instruments are relevant. 
 
3.3.2.   Orthogonality 
 
The orthogonality of the instruments hinges on two further conditions. First, we must rule out 
any reverse effect of growth on population density and/or oil reserves. Second, we must rule 
out any direct effect of the instruments on growth or any effect running through omitted 
variables. This second condition amounts to assuming that the two instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimating equation. For this reason it is commonly referred to as 
exclusion restrictions.   
Starting from reverse causality, growth may affect population density because workers tend 
to move from poorer to richer countries. In Africa, however, language, culture, geography, 
ethnicity, conflict, religion, and even legislation still create significant barriers to labour 
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mobility, distort the patterns of migration, and ultimately make population density 
substantially exogenous to income dynamics. Similarly, growth may affect country’s oil 
dependence if this latter is measured in terms of oil exports (as a fraction of GDP or of total 
exports). However, in this paper we use the oil stock at the beginning of the sample period, 
rather than oil exports, to measure oil intensity. The variable is taken from Norman (2009) 
and is part of a new wave of indicators used in the resource curse literature exactly to 
overcome the endogeneity issue (see Van der Ploeg, 2011).   
Moving on to the exclusion restrictions, conventional growth theory suggests that structural 
change may not be the only link between the two instruments and growth. For instance, in 
addition to crowding-out the manufacturing sector, abundant natural resources can affect 
growth through their impact on institutional quality, risk of war, and economic volatility. 
Similarly, one can argue that population density influences the cost of providing public 
goods, the size and scope of public expenditure, and soil quality, which are all factors that 
potentially determine growth. Still, there are good reasons to believe that these other links 
between the instruments and growth might not be very relevant in the African context.  
For one thing, both theoretical and empirical research indicate that dysfunctional 
governments, bad policies, and poor public service delivery in Africa are very much the result 
of ethnic divisions (see, for instance, Easterly and Levine, 1997) rather than population 
dynamics or resource abundance. Similarly, wars and violence are more the result of political 
exclusion and grievances (e.g. horizontal inequalities and divisions along the ethnic 
dimension) than a greedy attempt at controlling resources (see Stewart et al. 2008). For 
another, prevailing theoretical and empirical views of African underdevelopment indicate 
that, in addition to the quality of government, the variation in growth performance across 
African countries is mostly explained by geographical factors (e.g. exposure to disease and 
natural disasters) and different colonization experiences (e.g. British vs. France colonization); 
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see Bertocchi and Canova (2002), Nunn (2008), Bhattacharrya (2009), and Bleaney and 
Dimico (2010). These factors, in turn, seem to be exogenous to population density and oil 
reserves. 
All in all, these arguments provide some significant support to the assumption that our 
instruments are exogenous. In addition, since we have two instruments and only one 
endogenous regressor, we can use the overidentfying restriction to test the joint null 
hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded 
from the estimating equation. The relevant test is the Hansen J test: rejection of the null 
would cast doubt on the validity of the instruments. In fact, as shown in the next section, the 
null is never rejected. Finally, as further validation of the exclusion restrictions, Appendix 2 
(which we make separately available) reports additional evidence that population density and 
oil reserves (i) are not robustly correlated with economic growth after controlling for 
structural change and (ii) are not robustly correlated with other variables that are correlated 
with growth.  
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Baseline results 
Model (1) is estimated separately for each of the three versions of our structural change 
variable z, namely service correlation, industry correlation, and manufacturing correlation. 
The first stage of the estimation of model (1) consists in a regression of the structural change 
variables on the instruments (population density and oil reserves) and the other exogenous 
controls (ethnic fragmentation, initial income, UK legal origin, and distance from equator). 
We report these first stage estimates in Table 3. We are particularly interested in the partial 
R2 statistics and the associated robust F-statistics reported at the bottom of the table. Since the 
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partial R2 is obtained by partialling out the other exogenous controls, a rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the F-test  means that population density and oil reserves are highly correlated 
with structural change even after controlling for the other exogenous regressors. This in turn 
is evidence of their relevance  (see Baum et al. 2003).12  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
We can now turn to the core of our econometric results. Table 4 reports the second stage 
estimates of model (1) and a battery of diagnostic tests introduced in Section 3. Consider 
these diagnostics first. The null hypothesis of the Hansen J test is never rejected, as it must be 
necessarily the case for the instruments to be orthogonal to the error process. The null 
hypothesis of the Anderson LR test and the Cragg-Donald ɖ2 test is instead always rejected, 
meaning that the model is not underidentified. Finally, the Cragg-Donald F-statistic is always 
larger than the critical valu s computed by Stock and Yogo (2005). This is evidence that the 
equation is not weakly identified; that is, the instruments are strongly (as opposed to weakly) 
correlated with the exogenous regressors. Coupled with the theoretical considerations 
discussed in Section 3 and the additional evidence reported in Appendix 2, these diagnostics 
indicate that our instruments are likely to be valid.   
We consider now the estimated coefficients of the model. To start with, a couple of 
interesting results emerge with respect to the control variables. The non-significant 
                                                     
12 As already notied, given that there is only one endogenous regressor in model (1),  the partial R2 is equal to 
the Shea’s partial R2.
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coefficient of initial per-capita income implies that there is no evidence of conditional 
convergence (or even divergence) in the African continent. The negative growth effect of 
ethnic fractionalization discussed by Easterly and Levine (1997) shows up quite clearly in our 
estimates. Also in line with previous studies is the finding that UK legal origins promote 
growth. Most of African legal systems originate from either the English Common Law or the 
French Commercial Code. As argued by La Porta et al. (1999) the English Common Law was 
meant to protect the parliament and property owners against the abuses of the King. On the 
contrary, the French Code has developed more as an instrument used by the sovereign to 
control economic life. Institutions and governance systems that have evolved from the 
English Common Law tend to be of a higher quality and more conducive to financial 
development. This explains the positive coefficient of the UK legal origins dummy.  
The structural change variables appear to be both statistically and economically highly 
significant. In line with the conventional paradigm, the coefficient of manufacturing 
correlation is negative: the more negative the correlation between changes in the share of 
agriculture and changes in the share of services is, the faster the rate of growth will be. In 
other words, when value added is being reallocated from agriculture to manufacturing, 
growth accelerates.  However, the coefficient of service correlation is also negative, meaning 
that a reallocation away from agriculture and towards services (without necessarily passing 
through manufacturing) does not necessarily retard growth. There is quite a sizeable 
numerical difference between the two coefficients. To some extent, this might be due to the 
fact that service correlation has a much higher mean (in absolute value) and larger standard 
deviation than manufacturing correlation. Correcting for this difference in the scale of the 
two variables, the marginal effect of service correlation is larger, in line with the preliminary 
evidence from Table 2.  
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The positive coefficient of industry correlation, which is clearly the counterpart of the 
negative coefficient of service correlation, indicates that the sectoral shift from agriculture to 
overall industry is not conducive to faster growth. However, because reallocation to 
manufacturing is growth-enhancing, one can conclude that what is negative for growth is the 
decline in agriculture combined with the rise in non-manufacturing industry. As mentioned 
already a few times, non-manufacturing industry in Africa tends to be dominated by mining, 
so that in the end, our regression results establish a form of resource curse for the continent.   
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2  Sensitivity analysis and robustness checks 
 
We perform three main checks of the robustness of our result. First, we re-estimate our 
regression model including only time-invariant variables; that is, excluding initial per-capita 
income. Second, we apply the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator. 
As discussed by Stock et al. (2002) this is an estimator that is partially robust to weak 
instruments. In fact, the Cragg-Donald F statistic reported in Subsection 4.1 indicates that our 
instruments are not weak. Nevertheless, it is useful to see to see whether the statistical 
inference significantly changes when using LIML instead of the GMM estimator. Third, we 
estimate model (1) as a system of three equations. In practice, because our structural change 
variable z is threefold, model (1) incorporates three versions of the same growth equation: 
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where ser is the service correlation, ind is the industry correlation, and man is the 
manufacturing correlation. The estimates in tables 3 and 4 assume that each of the three 
versions of model (1) is estimated separately from the others. However, if there residuals are 
correlated across equations, then estimating the three versions jointly as a system is more 
efficient. Estimation in this case is again by GMM (see Wooldridge, 2003).13  
Table 5 summarizes the results of these additional checks. For each of the three structural 
change variables we report the estimated coefficients from model (1) without initial per-
capita income (top row), the estimated coefficients from system estimation (middle row), and 
the estimated coefficients from LIML estimation (bottom row).14 It is clear that the pattern of 
results is robust: service correlation and manufacturing correlation always have a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient.  
All in all, our econometric analysis suggests that the pattern of sectoral change matters for 
growth in Africa. Consistent with the conventional view, a strong negative correlation 
between changes in the value added share of agriculture and changes in the value added share 
of manufacturing increases growth. That is, a shift away from agriculture towards 
manufacturing creates the basis for growth accelerations. However, a reallocation from 
agriculture to services without passing through manufacturing is also conducive to growth 
and its marginal effect might even be stronger than the marginal effect of the reallocation 
from agriculture to manufacturing. In the end, what seems to worsen macroeconomic 
dynamics is a sectoral shift from agriculture to non-manufacturing industry.  
                                                     
13 Other system estimators (including the traditional 3SLS) can be viewed as special case of this GMM 
estimator.
14 In an attempt to save some space, we do not report the estimated coefficients of the other control variables. 
They are qualitatively very similar to those in Table 4. The full set of estimated coefficients is however available 
from the authors upon request. 
 
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In a broader perspective, our results contribute to the debate on the role of structural change 
in African development. Two positions seem to have emerged in the recent literature. On the 
one hand, using data at different levels of aggregation and different methodologies, 
Berthelemy and Soderling (2001), Poirson (2001), and Rodrik (2006) emphasize that the 
sectoral reallocation of labour from agriculture to non-agriculture sectors is key to sustainable 
productivity growth in Africa. MacMillan and Rodrik (2011) also provide evidence of a 
negative association between structural change and growth in countries where the 
employment share of agriculture has increased or, at least, not decreased. In particular, they 
indicate Zambia and Nigeria as two examples of this growth-reducing structural change. On 
the other hand, Breisinger et al. (2009) present results from a dynamic computable general 
equilibrium model which suggest that maintaining a large share of agriculture, even at the 
cost of slowing down structural change, is the way for a country like Ghana to achieve 
middle income status. Diao et al. (2010) generalize this conclusion on the role of agriculture 
as the mainstay of growth in Africa. We believe that our results complement and extend the 
first position in two directions: (i) structural change can be growth reducing even in the 
presence of a declining share of agriculture if the value added from agriculture feeds into 
non-manufacturing industry and (ii) the shift of value added from agriculture to services 
might be more growth enhancing than the shift from agriculture to manufacturing. This last 
point in particular raises a number of policy issues which are more extensively considered in 
the next section.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
The stylised facts and econometric results documented in sections 3 and 4 induce three main 
reflections on the role of services in the process of development. First of all, we hypothesize 
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that structural change without industrialization might not be an exclusive African prerogative. 
Mandeville and Kardoyo (2009) emphasize that in the knowledge-based economy (KBE) era, 
developing countries may be able to leapfrog the standard linear patterns of structural change 
that advanced countries historically progressed through. At the very least, the structural 
change pattern of development seems to have become more fluid in the KBE era. Some 
countries, such as China, continue to resemble the traditional patterns of reallocation from 
agriculture to manufacturing. But India, for example, has bypassed manufacturing and moved 
straight to services. Indonesia, instead, appears to have moved from agriculture to 
manufacturing and services simultaneously. It is likely that emerging roles for ICTs and 
services in the economy are driving these changes. Thus, ICTs may have become key 
enabling industries in both advanced and developing economies in the KBE era. For instance, 
the explosion of diffusion of mobile phones in Africa since 2000 will have hugely impacted 
on connectivity in the economy, thereby facilitating self-organised entrepreneurial and 
innovative activities in services (see Rooney et al. 2003), including development of new 
categories of services.15   
Second, models of structural change that explain the rise of the service sector through de-
industrialization forces are unlikely to apply to Africa. For instance, Rowthorn and Wells 
(1987) and Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1999) argue that expansion in services is the 
consequence of unbalanced productivity growth between manufacturing and services. In a 
nutshell, the argument is that output grows at similar rates in the two sectors, but labour 
productivity grows faster in manufacturing. As a consequence, the service sector absorbs a 
raising share of total employment at the expense of manufacturing. However, lack of 
industrialization in the first instance makes de-industrialization an unlikely mechanism in 
Africa. Moreover, the available evidence indicates that productivity in the service sector is 
                                                     
15 According to the April 17-18, 2010 issue of “The Economist” Magazine (pages 23-33), Kenya leads the world 
in money transfer via mobile phone. 

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not lagging16. The predominance of services, which were already the dominant sector in 
value added terms at the beginning of the 1960s, must be therefore explained through other 
mechanisms. Perhaps, the pattern of colonial rule in Africa was associated with relatively 
high levels of urbanisation and therefore high levels of activity in the services sector. 
Perhaps, aid dependency coupled with growth of the public sector, in the immediate post-
colonial period, explains both the large size and the rapid growth of the service sector in the 
1960s and early 1970s. 
Third, given the qualitative and quantitative importance of the service sector in African (as 
well as several non-African) economies, policymakers ought to devote some attention to 
increasing the efficiency in this sector. Here we point to the complementarities and 
interdependencies between services and both manufacturing and mining activities. 
Manufacturing and mining development require efficient transport, telecommunications, 
finance, business services, wholesale service, construction services, human capital (health 
and education), and governance services such as robust property rights, contract law and 
security/police services. Foreign direct investment in manufacturing and mining may obscure 
these necessary complementarities by bundling many of these services into the process. 
Successful long term development from FDI partly proceeds by unbundling some of these 
services, as well as manufacturing skills and activities, into the wider economy. 
There are other issues that emerge from our analysis and that will certainly deserve attention 
in future work. For instance, with more disaggregated data it should be possible to estimate 
structural specifications that explain the sectoral and intersectoral dynamics underlying the 
aggregate results we have presented here. Furthermore, the leapfrogging pattern we have 
                                                     
16 Labour productivity data by sector for African countries are not as widely available as sectoral output data. 
We have used sectoral output data from World Bank (2009) and sectoral employment data from ILO to compute 
output per worker by sector in 26 countries over the period 1980-2009. Average annual growth of labour 
productivity is 1.9% in services, 1.4% in manufacturing, 1.6% in non-manufacturing industry, and 0.7% in 
agriculture. Disaggregation by decades (available upon request) indicates that productivity growth accelerates in 
the ‘90s and 2000s in the service and non-manufacturing industry sectors. 
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documented in this paper might undermine African countries’ capacities to satisfy future 
changes in consumer demand or to build those production capacities and institutions needed 
for manufacturing-led growth17. In other words, these countries would be destined to a 
service-led growth pattern as opposed to a manufacturing-led growth pattern. This in turn 
calls for a more careful examination of the long-term development properties of service-led 
growth.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we study the effect of structural change on growth in Africa. First of all, we 
document a few stylised facts concerning the pattern of structural change in the continent. It 
appears that Africa is a tale of structural change without industrialization and without 
diversification. The five post-independence decades are characterised by a sharp decline in 
agriculture matched by an increase in services and non-manufacturing industry. 
Manufacturing has instead remained low and stagnant throughout the period of observation. 
These reallocations resulted in a positive relationship between the degree of sectoral 
concentration and the level of per-capita income; in other words, the average African country 
specializes (rather than diversifies) over almost its entire development path. 
Then, we move on to the formal analysis of the impact of these patterns of structural change 
on growth dynamics. To this purpose we estimate a growth regression model, using the 
correlation between changes in the share of agriculture and changes in the share of the other 
sectors as our measure(s) of structural change. After controlling for a number of other 
potential determinants of long-term growth, we find that reallocation from agriculture to 
services is not an obstacle to growth, even without going through the manufacturing phase of 
                                                     
17 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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structural transformation.18 What really seems to retard growth is the reallocation from 
agriculture to non-manufacturing industry. Because non-manufacturing industry in Africa is 
dominated by mining, we argue that our results also establish a form of resource curse for the 
continent. 
The above results stimulate a number of reflections on the role of services in the process of 
economic development. We flag some of these reflections in section 5 and we believe that 
further theoretical and empirical analysis of the hypothesis put forward in that section is a 
very promising avenue of future research. We also stress the importance of including issues 
relating to the service sector in the policy debate on structural transformation. While few 
would challenge the merits of promoting the emergence of a dynamic manufacturing sector, 
the focus on industrialization should not distract attention from the issues of increasing 
efficiency in the service sector and supporting the transformation in the agriculture sector 
from traditional to modern farming.  
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18 It would seem that in the KBE era, services can be associated with growth in both advanced and developing 
economies. 
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Appendix 1: Variables definition and data sources 
Name of the variable (and 
short name used in some 
tables) 
 
Definition Data sources 
Value added share of: 
- Agriculture 
- Industry 
- Manufacturing 
- Services 
 
Value added is the net output of a sector after 
adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate 
inputs. Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 
1-5. Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45. 
Manufacturing corresponds to ISIC division 15-37.  
Services correspond to ISIC 50-99. 
 
World Bank (2009) 
Per-capita GDP Per-capita GDP in constant US dollars (base year = 
2000) 
 
World Bank (2009) 
Herfindhal index  Measure of sectoral concentration computes as the 
sum of the squared value added shares of industry, 
agriculture, and services 
 
Authors’ computation 
based on World Bank 
(2009) 
Service correlation 
(ser_correl) 
Correlation coefficient between changes in the 
value added share of agriculture and changes in the 
value added share of services 
 
Authors’ computation 
based on World Bank 
(2009) 
Industry correlation 
(ind_correl) 
Correlation coefficient between changes in the 
value added share of agriculture and changes in the 
value added share of industry 
 
Authors’ computation 
based on World Bank 
(2009) 
Manufacturing correlation 
(manu_correl) 
Correlation coefficient between changes in the 
value added share of agriculture and changes in the 
value added share of manufacturing 
 
Authors’ computation 
based on World Bank 
(2009) 
Population density (pop_den) 
 
Midyear population divided by land area in square 
kilometres. 
 
World Bank (2009) 
 
Oil reserves (oilres) Value of oil reserves in 1970  Norman (2009) with 
updates from 
International Energy 
Agency. 
 
Soil_1 Dummy variable taking value 1 for steppe (low 
latitude) land 
 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
Soil_2 Dummy variable taking value 1 for desert (low 
latitude) land 
 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
Soil_3 Dummy variable taking value 1 for desert (middle 
latitude) land 
 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
Soil_4 Dummy variable taking value 1 for dry steppe 
wasteland 
 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
Legal origin UK (legor_uk) Dummy variable taking value for countries whose 
legal system originates from the British Common 
Law 
 
La Porta et al. (1999) 
Distance from equator Geogrpahical distance of a country capital city La Porta et al. (1999) 
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(lat_abst) from the equator (in Km) 
 
Ethnic fractionalization 
(ethnix) 
Probability that two randomly selected individuals 
will not be in the same ethnic group. Variable 
refers to the period 1970-1995. 
 
La Porta  et al. (1999) 
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Table 1: Average growth rates in subsets of Africa countries  
                          Agriculture 
 Increasing Decreasing 
Manufacturing   
Ͳ Increasing -0.653 (8) 
 
2.245 (19) 
Ͳ Decreasing -0.961 (5) 
 
1.319 (19) 
Industry   
Ͳ Increasing -1.031 (11) 
 
0.919 (7) 
Ͳ Decreasing 0.657 (2) 
 
1.972 (30) 
Services   
Ͳ Increasing -0.942 (4) 
 
3.298 (8)  
Ͳ Decreasing -0.696 (9) 
 
1.374 (30) 
Notes: The number in brackets indicate the number of countries in each subgroup. Growth rates are averaged 
across all countries in the subgroup and over the entire period of observation 1960-2008. See text for details on 
the identification of the subgroups. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Preliminary OLS regressions of sectoral change variables 
 
 I 
Ser_correl 
 
II 
Ind_correl 
 
III 
Manu_correl 
 
IV 
Ser_correl 
V 
Ind_correl 
VI 
Manu_correl
Pop_den 
 
-0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001 -0.002** 0.002** 0.001 
Oilres 
 
0.149*** -0.149*** 0.021*** 0.15*** -0.15** 0.021*** 
Soil_1 
 
... ... ... 0.072 -0.071 -0.003 
Soil_2 
 
... ... ... 0.258 -0.256 0.012 
Soil_3 
  
... ... ... -0.347 0.347 -0.305*** 
Soil_4 
 
... ... ... -0.176 0.176 -0.028 
       
F-test 
 
38.139*** 38.133*** 8.752*** 12.205*** 12.198*** 3.044** 
R2 
 
0.623 0.623 0.276 0.635 0.635 0.303 
Notes: *,**,*** denote statistical significance of estimated coefficients at 10%, 5%, 1% confidence level 
respectively. Estimates of the constant term in the regression are not reported 
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Table 3: Estimation of equation (1), first stage estimates 
 
 I 
Ser_correl 
 
II 
Ind_correl 
III 
Manu_correl 
Pop_den -0.005* 
 
0.005* 0.002* 
Oilreser 0.137*** 
 
-0.137*** 0.017*** 
Log(per capita GDP) 0.206 
 
-0.208 0.068 
Legor uk 0.067 
 
-0.061 0.076 
Lat abst -2.794 
 
2.814 -1.138** 
Ethnix -0.849 
 
0.851 -0.445** 
    
    
Partial R2 
(robust F-stat) 
0.7828 
(298.602)*** 
0.7835 
(298.288)*** 
0.3503 
(28.250)*** 
Notes: Per-capita GDP is measured at the beginning of the sample period (around 1960). Equations are 
estimated on a cross-section of 49 countries. The partial R2 is the squared partial correlation between the 
excluded instruments (population density and oil reserves) and the endogenous regressor. Since there is only one 
endogenous regressor in each equation, the partial R2 coincides with the Shea’s partial R2 measure of 
instrument relevance. The F-stat reported in the table is the statistic of the F-test of the excluded instruments that 
corresponds to the partial R2 *,**,*** denote statistical significance of estimated coefficients at 10%, 5%, 1% 
confidence level respectively. For the robust F-stat, *** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of the test of 
significance of the excluded instrument at the 1% confidence level. Estimates of the constant term in the 
regression are not reported 
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Table 4: Estimation of equation (2), second stage estimates 
 
 I 
 
II III 
Log(per capita GDP) 
 
0.313 0.314 0.494 
Legor uk 
 
1.080* 1.080* 1.155* 
Lat abst 
 
1.621 1.621 0.698 
Ethnix 
 
-2.646*** -2.641*** -3.267*** 
Ser_correl 
 
-0.416*** .. .. 
Ind_correl 
 
.. 0.417*** .. 
Manu_correl 
 
.. .. -2.778*** 
Instrument diagnostics 
    
Hansen J stat 
(p-value) 
0.292 
(0.588) 
0.296 
(0.587) 
0.751 
(0.386) 
    
Anderson LR t-stat 50.388 50.494 14.232 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Cragg-Donald ɖʹstat 
(p-value) 
118.93 
(0.000) 
112.41 
(0.000) 
17.79 
(0.000) 
    
Cragg-Donald F-stat 
(Stock and Yogo 
critical value) 
46.85 
(19.93) 
47.04 
(19.93) 
27.01 
(19.93) 
    
    
Notes: The dependent variable is always the average annual rate of per-capita GDP growth. Per-capita GDP is 
measured at the beginning of the sample period (around 1960). Equations are estimated on a cross-section of 49 
countries. Estimation is by two-step efficient GMM *,**,*** denote statistical significance of estimated 
coefficients at 10%, 5%, 1% confidence level respectively. Instrument diagnostics are as follows. The Hansen J 
test is the test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid (i.e. 
uncorrelated with the error term) and that the excluded instruments (population density and oil reserves) are 
correctly excluded from the estimated equation. The Anderson canonical correlations likelihood ratio (LR) test 
and the Cragg-Donald chi-squared test statistic are tests of whether the estimated equation is identified. The null 
hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified. The Cragg-Donal F-statistic is a test of the hypothesis that the 
equation is only weakly identified. The critical values are tabulated by Stock and Yogo (2005).  
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Table 5: Robustness checks 
 
 I 
Ser_correl 
 
II 
Ind_correl 
III 
Manu_correl 
 
GMM without per-
capita GDP 
 
 
 
-0.408*** 
 
0.408*** 
 
-2.883*** 
System estimates 
 
-0.246** 0.246** -1.089** 
 
 
LIML estimates 
 
-0.436*** 0.436*** -2.736* 
Notes : Only the estimated coefficients of the structural variables are reported. Estimated coefficients of the 
controls in each regression are available upon request. Structural change variables are included one at the time 
in each regression. See text for details on the different estimation methods. The dependent variable is always the 
average annual growth rate of per-capita GDP over the period 1960-2008. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance of the estimated coefficients at the 10%, 5%, 1% confidence level respectively. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Neighbour Regression Fit of value added shares and per-capita GDP  
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Figure 2: Neighbour Regression Fit of value added shares and time 
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Figure 3: Neighbour Regression Fit of the Herfindhal index of sectoral concentration and per-
capita GDP  
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Figure 4: Neighbour Regression Fit of changes in the sectoral share of agriculture and 
changes in the sectoral shares of the other sectors. 
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